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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

The Present Conflict of Ideals. A Study of the Philosophical Background of the War. By RALPH BARTON PERRY. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1918.—pp. xiii, 549.

This book of lectures delivered by Professor Perry at the University of California from January to May, 1918, and published in that year, was offered as an aid to those who were trying to understand the deeper issues of the war. The author also thought the book might serve as a companion volume to his *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, in which he had dealt with the technicalities and fundamentals, while in the work before us his attention is turned to the moral, emotional, political, and religious implications. It was his hope "to bring to light the deeper conflict of ideas and ideals, of creeds and codes—of philosophies of life, in short—that underlies the conflict of submarines, airplanes, and howitzers." Like many other thinking men Professor Perry believed that our general ideas and ultimate values were at stake, and he predicted that the age after the war would be a new age, "not so much because the map of Europe will be changed but rather because the map of the human mind will be changed." "It is our present expectation and determination," he said, "that certain ideas, like national aggrandizement, at present supported by most redoubtable champions, will find only a narrow and insecure lodgment in the human mind; and that other ideas such as international justice and domestic self-government shall be the big and triumphant ideas" (p. 2). With the desire to help to create a mutual understanding between friends and foes alike and to be able to construct a world-map of convictions, creeds, ideas, he endeavored to find the deeper ideal bonds that unite us and the irreconcilable differences of belief and conscience that divide us. We went into the war on a moral issue, for the safety and victory of the things we account best—integrity, gentleness, peace, liberty; in a sense we went out of our way to go to war; we were guided by a deliberate judgment of right and wrong. And so it is not to be wondered that we should be asked to turn our minds to the study of the philosophies of life, the codes, creeds, and ideals by which men live, and to which they appeal in their reflective moments for justification of their acts and policies.

Professor Perry finds four great tendencies at work in the pre-war civilization: naturalism, idealism, pragmatism, and realism, of which the mightiest is naturalism, meaning by this the materialistic metaphysics, the scientific method adopted as a creed and code, the application of science to the life of man, and the conception of evolution. Over and against this, stands idealism, which he conceives as the champion of moral and religious faith, the philosophy which proclaims the ascendancy or priority of the world of consciousness over the world of bodies. Pragmatism represents the revolt against reason and emphasizes life as the essential reality and as the supreme good. Realism, he modestly thinks, must evidently bide its time and content itself for the present with laying claim to the future. To a study of these four movements Professor Perry devotes the larger portion of his book (pp. 10-380); reserving the latter part (pp. 381-545) for the philosophy of nationality and the national traits and ideals of Germany, France, England, and the United States.

The ending of the great conflict has not robbed the task which Professor Perry had set himself either of its interest or of its importance. The map of the human mind has not been changed, nor are we on the eve of an era of integrity, gentleness, peace, and liberty. There is still need of ideal bonds of union, of big ideas that shall be triumphant; and these are perhaps harder to realize in the time of peace than before. By labeling a conception, a policy, a mode of conduct 'German', we were able a short while ago to put the quietus on it: whatever was German was wrong. This simple touchstone of truth will no longer avail. The German intellectuals justified the German war and the German way of conducting it, their previous world-views often to the contrary notwithstanding. They are now fighting the peace that has been imposed upon them with a different set of principles, the principles to which our President Wilson gave such clear and eloquent utterance, and which they now believe to have been cherished by their greatest philosophers. In the hour of adversity and defeat, a world-order based upon justice and humanity appeals to them; only they interpret justice somewhat differently from the Allies, interpret it in a manner that will help them in their misery.

A world-map of convictions, creeds, and ideas will show us what creeds have failed to meet the test of life, and enable us to prepare our moral reserves for peace. In speaking of the situation as it existed in the beginning of 1918, Professor Perry said: "The greatest advantage which the Allies enjoy over the Central Powers is a philo-

sophical, a moral advantage . . . They have a philosophy, a creed which need excite no man's fears, and which has the power of rallying all enlightened men to its support. Sooner or later it cannot fail to prevail, because it is to every man's interest that it should" (p. 19). This means that every man has an abiding interest in justice, mercy, and truth; it was to the faith in these that those who pleaded the allied cause appealed when things looked black. It is still worth inquiring what are the deeper issues underlying our peace-policies, whether we propose to remain loyal to the ethical ideals which were exalted in the days of the war, or whether these are to be handed over to the underdogs for their consolation and edification.

It is instructive to discover the implications of a philosophy or a creed, as Professor Perry attempts to do, for to understand its implications or its full meaning may determine one's acceptance or rejection of it. It must be remembered, however, that different and even opposing conclusions are, and sometimes can be legitimately, drawn from the same premises, and that the same conceptions may affect different minds differently.¹ Professor Perry knows this, but he does not always seem to me to keep it in mind. Thus the natural-scientific method, spirit, and results do not necessarily encourage liberalism, justice, democracy, progress, and all other good things. The desire to see things as they actually are, whether in external nature or in the domain of the mind, is a great factor in human progress; but seeing without evaluating will not avail. Professor Perry's own accounts show this to be the case. Science is said to favor utilitarianism, with its consequence-theory and happiness-theory, and individualism; and yet biologists reject happiness both as end and motive. Moreover, while English utilitarianism measures and tests "institutional policies by their distributive effect upon the well-being of men and women," it would be just as 'scientific' to test them by their unified effect upon the greatness and glory of the nation (p. 65). There is an evolutionism that flies in the face of modern ethical and political ideals, and which Nietzsche, in his earlier period, made the basis of his aristocratic, anti-democratic, anti-religious power philosophy, and which scientific thinkers recommend to states both for external and internal use. Professor Perry him-

¹ I am reminded of a passage in Ritchie's *Natural Rights* in this connection: "And all abstract theories about human society admit of divergent and conflictive application. Thus the theory of social contract is used by Hobbes to condemn rebellion, and by Locke to justify it. The conception of social organism is used by Plato to justify the extremest interference with individual liberty, and by Mr. Herbert Spencer to condemn a very moderate amount of State control" (page 14).

self declares that "Darwinism vigorously (rigorously?) interpreted defines no value save that of survival of the competing unit of life under whatever conditions may happen to exist" (p. 149); and "science meant power, yes power for evil as logically and as readily as power for good. Mankind will not soon forget that there is little virtue in the control of forces if they are not subordinated to a wise and beneficent policy." "Progress, even worldly progress, is not entirely, or even mainly a matter of the control of physical nature." German science had reached a high state of development before the war without making Germany, or even her men of science, democratic.

Science, says Professor Perry, is without reverence for the established and privileged, opposed to social privilege or to political authority. A scientific age is congenial to radicalism. The cult of science carries with it a glorification of man's intellectual faculties. It also equalizes men: for science all men belong to the animal species. The tendency of science is to promote the growth of democracy. Philanthropic regard for the poor, sick, and ignorant has received a fresh impetus from science. Science judges institutions by their utility; the state is a mechanism to be scrapped if obsolete or uneconomical. Even the German government's ultimate appeal is to the people whose individual welfare is affected by acts of government. But Darwinism is science, and the Darwinian ethics, according to Professor Perry himself, would condemn humanitarianism and democracy. His interpretation of the Darwinian ethics shows that there is little comfort to be derived from it for modern ethical or political aspirations.

If Professor Perry had been a German, he would doubtless have regarded the Darwinian theory as the cause of the war. Instead, he chooses poor Kant as the scapegoat, and characterizes his ethics as logically the most menacing imaginable. He admits that formalism when allied with traditionalism may be entirely innocuous; but in the hands of a Nietzschean superman things would be different (p. 181). Yes, so would any theory, misinterpreted and misapplied, become a menace. Kant has been called the philosopher of Protestantism, and Protestantism itself with its appeal to the individual conscience may become a menace: it is such in the eyes of Catholicism. There is danger in any ethical theory that finds the essence of morality in the purity of the motive, and Kant lays stress on the motive. But so does Christianity. Kant, however, does not simply declare that the act is good when the motive is good; he *defines* the good motive: it must be one which reason (not sub-

jective opinion) conceives as fit for universal legislation, one that would make a rational human order possible, an order in which truth and justice and mercy shall reign. A person who remembers only a few general statements of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and misinterprets the spirit of the work may perhaps find it an inspiration to breach of faith and unholy deeds. The consequence-theory can be and has been misinterpreted in the same way as justifying all kinds of immoralities: the end justifies the means. If it had been the German philosophy, it would have been so described, and held responsible for the war. As it is, the German failure to accept it is given as the cause. However that may be, the Germans certainly appealed to it and not to Kant in justification of every atrocity; the end justified the means: the violation of Belgium was a practical necessity for winning the war, and winning the war was to be the means of the highest good for the whole world. They did not appeal to the *Critique of Practical Reason*—how could any sane person go to that book to justify breach of faith and cruelty! It is true, Bernhardt does mention the name of Kant, but he takes the names of many men in vain, among them those of some good Englishmen—including that of Darwin—and that of our own Roosevelt himself.

But the result of the teaching of self-realization is said to be even more barren and dangerous than that of Kant. Here the viciousness “lies in the fact that the moral agent is encouraged to ignore every form of external check.” “There is nothing, however hurtful to others or at variance with traditional morality, that some moral agent may not do with the most whole-hearted conviction.” “A man with a ‘self’ may easily become a common nuisance or even a dangerous paranoiac” (p. 239). This is undoubtedly the case, and one has every reason to fight shy of crowds of practical self-realizers in our society; many persons have selves that ought to be corked up rather than permitted to effervesce. We have here a situation which confronts every theory of ethics. Whether he obeys his conscience, or the categorical imperative, or subordinates himself to the reason revealed in the state, or follows the traditional morality of his people, or judges acts according to the consequences, or seeks to order his life according to the principles of self-realization, a man may go wrong in applying the standards if he lacks intelligence. Even Christianity with its teaching of brotherly love and purity of heart may become a menace in the hands of a fool, yet one would not consider the fool’s behavior as expressive of the spirit of the doctrine.

It is true, Professor Perry regards as the chief defect of the idealistic view the teaching that man is construed as a vehicle of the spiritual principle in the world; and "pure spirit can do no evil, and neither can a man who acts according to the spiritual principle, that is, selfconsciously and autonomously" (p. 238). He is perhaps thinking of Green in this connection, but Green would certainly not call a man who does evil from a so-called pure motive good; indeed, he would say that such a motive was not pure enough. I do not believe that one can take the abstract general formula of any theory and judge the theory by it alone, without considering the concrete content upon which the formula is based. One can win easy victories by showing the barrenness and even harmfulness of such principles as the love of neighbor, social justice, the rights of man, freedom, and the like, but they certainly can be made to mean something definite and practicable; they are indeed things to conjure with, and they have translated themselves into living realities.

It is not surprising, in view of Professor Perry's interpretations, that he holds Kant, Fichte, and Hegel responsible for the theory which conceives the state as a finality. He admits that the notion of state personality did not originate with Kantian idealism, but thinks that in appealing to the principle of organic unity, absolute idealism does offer a theoretical justification for the literal acceptance of a careless metaphor: the whole to which the human individual belongs and in the light of which he must be understood and evaluated is the state. This conception he finds in Bosanquet. He forgets, however, that Bosanquet qualifies his view: the state is the supreme good *saving only* the Absolute Good; and: "in the end the individual's true nature lies beyond his visible self—*e.g.*, in religion the individual, as such, is absorbed." A passage from Bosanquet which Professor Perry himself quotes, shows what is meant: "The important thing in human life is not that individuals should be saved, but that certain highly developed and unique modes of life should be preserved" (p. 272). The English philosopher believes that this ideal can be best realized by nationalism. "A true patriotism is in the first place a daily and sober loyalty, which recognizes the root of our moral being in the citizen spirit and citizen duty; and in the second place is a love for our country, as an instrument and embodiment of truth, beauty, and kindness, or, in the largest and profoundest sense of the word, of religion" (p. 273). The state, therefore, is not an absolute finality, but a means of producing the highest ethical value. "It is for us the vehicle of the value of the world. It stands for our contribution

to the general sum of what humanity has achieved and what makes any life worth living" (p. 258).

It is because Bosanquet believes that "the *quality* of humanity—whether culture or humaneness—is rather to be discovered in the life of the great civilized nations, with all their faults, than in what is common to all men," that he insists upon nationalism and opposes internationalism. To him "there is something weak-kneed in humanitarianism." He finds no organism in humanity, no communal consciousness of all mankind. The nations do not in point of fact possess a general will. Their general wills taken together are not one will, that is, they have not in common the same principal objects or views of life. It is true, as Professor Perry points out, that on this view human society at large retains an aspect of pluralism and externality. Bosanquet, however, assumes that a healthy state will be preoccupied with the higher non-competitive interests, that is, with kindness, beauty, truth, with moral values. But if that is so, the 'healthy' states would have a common international will, and there would be some guarantee of unity and peace. Yet Bosanquet does not find even a common norm of feeling and judgment on which a universal policy could be based. For him, therefore, "strength in war is the first condition of the state's fulfilment of its function." This is a disappointing conclusion, not one, however, to which we are necessarily driven by the idealistic philosophy. The state is in a measure an end in itself: it is the vehicle of the value of the world; in so far as it realizes the good—"truth, beauty, kindness"—it justifies itself. If this is so, it must, as A. C. Bradley, quoted by Professor Perry, declares, have a regard for the moral character of its members and for the rights of alien states.

Professor Perry holds that if the state is a person, if it is the highest of historical persons, then in the theory of self-realization it need not regard anything but its own state self-consciousness. It must suppose that the absolute spirit is best served by the freest and fullest expression of such promptings as come from within the souls that are the most state-minded. And "such a theory is a threat against every interest that lies outside the circle of such a self-consciousness" (p. 264). I think this criticism forgets that, according to absolute idealism, there are universal truths and values which the state self-consciousness and the individual consciousness freely accept, and without which there could be no rational social order. It was to avoid a dangerous subjectivism that Hegel appealed to the ethos of a people and the reason embodied in the state in preference to the in-

dividual conscience, and beyond that to the reason revealing itself in history, and even beyond that to philosophy. For Hegel the Prussian state was not a finality, nor any other state; it was a mere transition in the evolution of states and would be overcome. Hegel might have reached the conception of a league of nations, a highest anthesis of law and justice. Instead, he accepted the notion of a conflict of states in history, the victory of the better over the good, the alternation of great political powers. After all, the thing of real worth in Hegel's theory was the attempt to reconcile the individual with society; and this thought would point to the reconciliation of societies among themselves. The principle of unification is for him the developing reason, which he conceived metaphysically as *der Geist Gottes in der Welt*. The important idea is that there is a rational order and a rational right; and this, not subjective opinion, not the unintelligent personal conscience, is the standard of conduct for the state and the individual. There is no compulsion for the individual who understands the meaning of the institutions, of the laws, of the state: these represent his own rational will. The individual is not a subject but a free man. It was to avoid the subjectivism to which Professor Perry constantly objects in Kantian idealism that Hegel sought refuge in objective reason, the reason in human institutions. In his opposition to a disintegrating individualism, he overemphasized the social element, contrary, I think, to the spirit of his own philosophy.

As for Kant's responsibility for the philosophies of those who came after him, it is true, as Professor Perry says, that one can begin with Kant and end in Hegelianism. Yes, but one can also end in Herbartianism and Schopenhauerism and in numerous other ways. The 'true' successors of Kant were many, just as the 'logical' successors of Descartes were many, constituting a motley crowd of materialists, idealists, atheists, pantheists, and what not.

In spite of my disagreements with Professor Perry (perhaps because of them), I have found his book interesting and stimulating. Works of this kind will prove very helpful to the many persons who wish to understand the intellectual tendencies of the age and to find, if possible, a rational view of life and the world.

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Cultural Reality. By Florian Znanincki. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill., 1919.—pp. xv, 359.

This book, by a Polish philosopher now a lecturer on Polish history and institutions in the University of Chicago, represents a stand-